Site licensing of electronic journals has revolutionized the way academic information is distributed. However, many librarians are concerned about the possibility that commercial publishers might abuse site licensing by the practice of bundling. In this paper, we analyze how bundling affects journal pricing in the market of scientific, technical, and medical electronic journals and offer a novel insight on the bundling of a large number of information goods. We find that (i) when bundling is prohibited, surprisingly, industry concentration does not affect prices; (ii) when bundling is allowed, each publisher finds bundling profitable and bundling increases industry profits while reducing social welfare; and (iii) any merger among publishers already active in the market is profitable but reduces social welfare. (JEL: D4, K21, L41, L82)
Introduction
Site licensing of electronic journals (e-journals, henceforth) has revolutionized the way academic information is distributed. With site licensing, there is no need to spend time looking for a paper in a library, and many people can download, read, and print a paper simultaneously from their offices at any given time. Furthermore, e-journals' web sites provide additional services such as search tools, hypertext linking, remote access, and so forth. Therefore it seems that, sooner or later, e-journals will supplant print journals as the norm.
However, many librarians are concerned about the possibility that commercial publishers might abuse site licensing for private gain. First, commercial publishers have aggressively raised prices at a rate that is disproportionate to any increase in costs or quality. According to the Association of Research Libraries (ARL), in the United States, during the period 1986-2002, the unit cost for journal subscriptions has grown at the rate of 7.7% per year, which is more than twice the 3.6% growth rate in the unit cost of monographs (books). 1 As Figure 1 shows, through 2000 the increase in library budgets could not match the increase in journal prices, which resulted in a continuous decrease in the number of journals purchased during most of the period. High subscription prices charged by commercial publishers even induced some academic societies whose journals had been published by such publishers to start new competing journals, as with the launch of the Journal of the European Economic Association. 2 Second, site licensing of e-journals allows commercial publishers to employ powerful pricing strategies such as price discrimination based on usage 3 and bundling; with print journals, publishers practiced neither bundling nor discrimination between libraries in terms of subscription prices. 4 In particular, librarians are concerned about bundling. For instance, according to Kenneth Frazier (2001) , director of libraries at University of Wisconsin-Madison, "The content is 'bundled' so that 1. See "Monograph and Serial Costs in ARL Libraries 1986-2002" at http://www.arl.org/stats/ arlstat/. 2. In other disciplines, there are several cases in which the editorial board of a journal owned by a commercial publisher resigned and founded an alternative journal. See Theodore Bergman's web site: http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/˜tedb/Journals/alternatives.html. 3. For instance, Derk Haank (2001) , the CEO of Elsevier Science, says, "What we are basically doing is to say that you pay depending on how useful the publication is for you-estimated by how often you use it." See also Bolman (2002) and Key Perspectives (2002) with regard to price discrimination. 4. In the case of print journals, arbitrage through resale has to some extent limited publishers' ability to practice price discrimination. In contrast, for e-journals the access to a journal is simply leased and hence resale is impossible.
individual journal subscriptions can no longer be cancelled in their electronic format. (The Academic Press IDEAL program and the full ScienceDirect package offered by Elsevier are examples of such licensing agreements)." 5 Moreover, U.S. and U.K. competition authorities approved four years ago one of the biggest-ever science publishing mergers, between Reed-Elsevier (RE henceforth) and Harcourt, in spite of many librarians' protests. Indeed, the report of the U. K. Competition Commission (2001) shows concern about potential welfare losses due to the merging publishers' bundling of their e-journals. Before the merger, RE's ScienceDirect was the most developed web site and offered access to about 1,150 journals and Harcourt's IDEAL offered access to 320 journals.
In this paper, we analyze publishers' incentives to practice bundling and the ensuing effects on social welfare, and we derive implications for merger analysis. To isolate the effect of bundling under price discrimination, we consider a mature stage of e-journals in which publishers practice price discrimination based on usage. 6 Therefore, we assume away heterogeneity among libraries and build a model in which each competing publisher offers a set of journals to a library that wants to build a portfolio of journals and monographs under a budget constraint. 7 We analyze how bundling affects journal pricing through its impact on the library's allocation of budget between journals and books. Although we assume that there is no direct substitution among journals (i.e., the value the library derives from a journal is determined independently of whether or not it buys any other journal), there can be an indirect substitution among journals and among journals and monographs 8 through the budget constraint. The utility that the library derives from spending money on books is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave.
We first consider independent pricing (no bundling) and show an irrelevance result that industry concentration does not affect prices. For instance, in the simple case of homogeneous journals (in which every journal has the same value) we show that, regardless of the level of industry concentration, there exists a unique equilibrium in which all the journals are sold at the same price. In the general case of heterogeneous journals, we show that there is a unique equilibrium 5. He further argues that "the push to build an all-electronic collection can't be undertaken at the risk of (1) weakening that collection with journals we neither need nor want, and (2) increasing our dependence on publishers who have already shown their determination to monopolize the information market place." 6. This implies that the pricing schemes studied in this paper might not correspond to what we observe now. In fact, the transition implies a change from subscription-based pricing models to usage-based models. Because a sudden switch in the pricing models generates a large change in the total price required for a library to maintain its subscription to a given collection of journals, publishers are introducing a progressive change (Bolman 2002) . 7. Typically, an academic library's material budget is spent on journals and monographs (Gooden, Owen, and Simon 2002) . 8. As a result of journal price increases, many university libraries have been forced to reallocate dollars from monographs to journals (Kyrillidou 1999). candidate regardless of the level of industry concentration and that the equilibrium always exists both under maximum concentration (the monopoly case) and under minimum concentration, where each publisher sells only one journal. 9 Therefore, the outcome under minimum concentration is equivalent to the outcome under maximum concentration. The irrelevance result is related to the fact that, under independent pricing, each journal is priced according to what we call "marginal opportunity cost pricing" in the following sense: When a publisher sells a journal, it expects that this journal is the marginal journal (i.e., the last journal purchased by the library) and so chooses a price p, to match the library's opportunity cost of using p instead on books, such that the library is indifferent between buying the journal at p and spending p on buying extra books. A monopolist cannot realize a higher profit than the one under marginal opportunity cost pricing because, in order to realize a higher profit, he would have to increase the price of the marginal journal and this induces the library not to buy the journal.
When bundling is allowed, we show that each publisher has an incentive to bundle all its journals. We identify two effects of bundling. First, bundling has the direct effect of softening competition from books. To provide intuition, we consider a monopolist who publishes two journals of the same value u. Under independent pricing, this publisher expects that each of these journals is the last journal to be purchased and chooses the same price p for them. Suppose now that the publisher bundles the journals and chooses the price 2p for the bundle. Then the library is strictly better off buying the bundle than spending 2p on books; because the marginal utility from spending money on books strictly decreases, the utility from spending 2p on books is strictly smaller than twice the utility from spending only p on books. Therefore, the monopolist can charge 2p + ε (i.e., more than 2p) for the bundle and still induce the library to buy it. This direct effect of bundling increases with the size of bundle, which implies that a large publisher gains more than a small publisher in terms of the direct effect.
Second, a publisher's bundling has an indirect effect of inflicting negative pecuniary externalities on all other publishers. The very fact that bundling allows a publisher to increase its own profit implies that, after a publisher's bundling, there is less budget left for books and for all the other publishers' journals. This in turn implies that, for all the other publishers, competition from books is tougher and hence they must lower the prices of their journals in order to sell them. In particular, a small publisher with only a few journals does not gain much from the direct effect of bundling, but it may lose a lot from the indirect effect if big publishers bundle their journals. Therefore, bundling is a profitable and credible strategy: It not only increases the bundling publisher's profit but also decreases the profits of rivals and can even make them unable to sell their journals.
9. For the intermediate case of oligopoly, we give a sufficient condition for equilibrium existence in Theorem 2 (see Section 4). The irrelevance result holds as long as the equilibrium exists.
The direct and indirect effects of bundling suggest that any merger increases the merging publishers' profits because of the direct effect while reducing rivals' profits because of the indirect effect. We also show that bundling (or any merger) increases industry profits. This result implies that the library purchases fewer books after bundling. Because bundling can make small publishers unable to sell their journals, we conclude that bundling decreases social welfare by reducing both book and journal consumption. For the same reasons, any merger among active publishers reduces social welfare. Our finding is consistent with the prediction of Kyrillidou (1999) that, if the current trend continues, the budget for monographs will be the resource depleted most rapidly and that, by 2019, only about 10% of the materials budget will be spent on purchasing monographs. Finally, when we examine a publisher's incentive to acquire a journal from a third party, we find that in the absence of bundling all publishers have the same willingness to pay for the journal, whereas under bundling the largest publisher always has the highest willingness to pay. This suggests that bundling might seriously affect industry dynamics, with the largest publisher becoming even larger through the purchase of titles sold by small publishers that are forced to exit the market.
Most of the papers on bundling study bundling of two (physical) goods in the context of second-degree price discrimination and focus on either surplus extraction (Schmalensee 1984; McAfee et al. 1989; Salinger 1995; Armstrong 1996 Armstrong , 1999 or entry deterrence (Whinston 1990; Nalebuff 2004) . The papers of Brynjolfsson (1999, 2000) are an exception in that they study bundling of a large number of information goods while maintaining the framework of second-degree price discrimination. Their first paper shows that bundling allows a monopolist to extract more surplus because it reduces the variance of average valuations by the law of large numbers, 10 and their second paper applies this insight to entry deterrence. Our paper also studies the bundling of any number of information goods. The novelty is that we show that bundling is a profitable and credible strategy-in terms both of surplus extraction and entry deterrence-even when sellers have complete information on the buyer's valuation for each product (so that the law of large numbers plays no role) and there is no interdependency among valuations of different products. Conventional wisdom says that bundling has no effect in such a setting and this is true if the budget constraint is not binding. However, if the constraint is binding then we show that each firm has a strict incentive to adopt bundling.
Our paper is related to McCabe (2002b) , who studies the transition from print journals (no price discrimination and no bundling) to e-journals (prefect price discrimination and bundling). 11 Although his setting is similar to ours, there are important differences. First, he considers the transition whereas we consider the situation when this transition is completed. Second, he does not provide the comparative statics of the transition; we provide the comparative statics of bundling versus no bundling in the digital world. Furthermore, McCabe assumes bundling in the case of e-journals whereas we show that, in equilibrium, all publishers adopt bundling. Finally, he does not consider the substitution between books and journals, and his results often rely on numerical examples. Edlin and Rubinfeld (2004) also argue that bundling of academic journals builds strategic barriers to entry, but they do not present any formal model. McCabe and Snyder (2004) analyze the market for academic journals from a two-sided market perspective but do not study bundling.
The comparison between bundling and independent pricing in our paper is also related to the comparison between patent pooling and independent licensing of patents in Lerner and Tirole (2004) . In particular, publishers' pricing decisions in our paper are driven by what they call the "competitive margin" in the sense that each publisher cannot raise its prices without triggering an exclusion of its journal(s) from the portfolio of journals bought by the library. However, there are two important differences. First, Lerner and Tirole consider a simple case in which each owner owns only one patent and hence there is no issue of patent pooling at the individual owner level, whereas we consider a general case in which each firm owns multiple journals and therefore bundling is decided at the firm level. Second, patent pooling consequently implies a change from the minimum industry concentration to a monopoly in their paper, whereas we compare bundling with independent pricing for any given level of industry concentration.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, we consider the simple case of homogeneous journals and explain all our main results with minimum technical details. In Section 4, we consider the general case of heterogeneous journals. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. All the proofs that do not appear in the main text are relegated to the Appendix.
Model
As we said in the introduction, we consider the mature stage of site licensing in which journal prices depend on usage and assume that publishers have complete information about the value that a library attaches to a journal. This assumption allows us to focus on the effects of bundling that arise when buyers have no private 11. McCabe (2002a) provides an empirical analysis showing that mergers significantly contributed to journal price increases.
information. Therefore, we consider only one library with a budget M > 0 that is assumed to be known to all publishers. 12
Journals and Publishers
There are N publishers; publisher j is often denoted simply by j . We consider only profit-maximizing publishers. Let n j ≥ 1 be the number of journals that publisher j publishes (j = 1, . . . , N) and let n ≡ N j =1 n j (≥ N) be the total number of journals. Let u ij > 0 represent the utility (or the surplus) the library obtains from journal i = 1, . . . , n j of publisher j . Let U j ≡ n j i=1 u ij and U ≡ N j =1 U j . Journals are said to be homogeneous when u ij = u > 0 for all i and j .
Because we focus on how bundling affects which journals are sold and at what prices, we assume that n number of journals are already produced (i.e., the fixed cost of having the first copy of each journal has already been incurred). We assume that the marginal cost of distributing a journal is zero.
When each journal is sold independently (i.e., in the absence of bundling), publisher j chooses price p ij > 0 for each journal i that it owns. Let p ≡ (p 11 , . . . , p n 1 1 , . . . , p 1N , . . . , p n N N ) ∈ R n ++ represent the price vector under independent pricing. Under bundling, publisher j chooses price P j > 0 for the bundle of all its journals, which we denote by Bj . Let P ≡ (P 1 , . . . , P N ) ∈ R N ++ denote the price vector under bundling.
The Library
The library's budget M > 0 is given, and we study how bundling affects the library's allocation of that budget between journals and books. The library's payoff is given by the sum of three components: the utility it obtains from the journals it purchased, the utility it obtains from the books it bought, and the money left after all purchases. We define a reduced-form utility for books by using an indirect utility function v : When each journal is sold independently, we let x ij ∈ {0, 1} represent the library's choice about journal ij : x ij = 1 (resp. x ij = 0) means that the library buys (resp. does not buy) this journal. When all publishers use bundling, we let Bj denote bundle j and X j ∈ {0, 1} represent the library's choice about 12 . Considering only one library is without loss of generality in our framework because publishers can price discriminate with respect to u ij and M.
Bj : X j = 1 (X j = 0) means that the library buys (does not buy) this bundle. Let x ≡ (x 11 , . . . , x n 1 1 , . . . , x 1N , . . . , x n N N ) ∈ {0, 1} n and X ≡ (X 1 , . . . , X N ) ∈ {0, 1} N . Under independent pricing and given (p, M), the library chooses x and m ≥ 0 to maximize its payoff, 13
subject to the budget constraint
14 The library's maximization problem under bundling is similarly defined using (U 1 , . . . , U N ), P, and X.
Social Welfare
Social welfare is defined as the sum of the payoff of the library, the profits of the journal publishers, and the profit of the book industry. The cost of producing a book is composed of a fixed cost and a marginal cost, about which we make a simplifying assumption: The fixed cost incurred by the book industry is not affected by the library's choice of m, and the marginal cost of producing a book is zero. 15 Then, social welfare is equal to the total utility the library obtains from journals and books up to a constant.
Timing and Equilibrium Selection
We consider the following game, denoted by , in which each publisher simultaneously decides (i) whether to be active or not and, if active, (ii) whether or not to bundle its journals and (iii) the price(s) of its bundle or journals. If a publisher is not active, then it does not offer any journal or bundle and hence the library cannot buy that publisher's journal(s) or bundle.
For equilibrium selection, we assume in Section 3 (where we consider homogeneous journals) that a publisher decides not to be active if it expects to make 13. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that (i) if the library is indifferent between buying a journal (or a bundle) and not buying it, then it buys the journal/bundle; and (ii) if the library is indifferent between two or more combinations of journals and/or bundles, then it chooses the combination with the highest aggregate value of journals. 14. In Section 2.4 we describe how each publisher should first decide whether or not to be active before choosing prices. Hence, (1) is correct if all publishers become active. If some are not active, then j runs over the set of active publishers. 15. This is only a simplifying assumption. Our social welfare analysis is not qualitatively affected when the cost incurred by the book industry, denoted by c(m), depends on m-as long as consuming more books is desirable from the social point of view (i.e., v (m) 
zero profit (i.e., if the publisher expects the library will not buy its bundle or any of its journals). The assumption can be justified if a publisher would incur a very small but positive cost of contracting with the library. Without this assumption, the prices of some items (journals/bundles) the library buys may depend on the prices of the items the library does not buy, as shown by an example in Section 3.2.
We first study in Section 3.1 the game in which no publisher bundles its journals; we use I to denote this game. Then, in Section 3.2, we analyze the game B in which all active publishers bundle their journals; in Section 3.3, we examine each publisher's incentive to choose between bundling and not bundling in game .
The Simple Case of Homogeneous Journals
In this section we derive all our main results in the simple case of homogeneous journals, which means that u ij = u > 0 for all ij .
Independent Pricing
We begin our analysis by examining I , the game in which each active publisher prices its journals independently. It turns out that, in equilibrium, the competitive margin (Lerner and Tirole 2004) binds in the sense that each publisher cannot raise the price of any of its journals without inducing the library to exclude the journal from the portfolio of journals it buys. For expositional facility, we first introduce the concept of a marginal bundle of books as follows. Consider the decision problem that the library faces with respect to the marginal journal (i.e., the last journal it purchases) with price p. If the library does not buy this journal, then it can use p to buy extra books. Let π (≤M) denote the journal industry profit when the marginal journal is bought. We define the marginal bundle of books corresponding to price p as all the books that the library wishes to buy with p after spending M − π on books. Then, the utility from the marginal bundle of books is given by
Hence, when u = U MB (p, π ) holds, the publisher selling the marginal journal cannot raise its price without triggering an exclusion of the journal from the list of the journals bought by the library. We describe in the next lemma some properties of U MB that will be used frequently in the rest of the paper. The proof of this lemma is omitted because it follows directly from the fact that v(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
As a benchmark, we consider the case of minimum industry concentration in which each publisher owns only one journal (N = n). Suppose that all publishers charge the same price p ≤ M/n. Then, the library prefers buying n number of journals (with 1 ≤ n ≤ n) to buying n − 1 journals if and only if the following inequality holds:
Lemma 1(i) implies that U MB (p, n p) strictly increases with n ; therefore, it is optimal for the library to buy all the journals if and only if it prefers buying n number of journals to buying n − 1, a condition that is equivalent to u ≥ U MB (p, np) .
is an equilibrium. Suppose that all publishers except j charge p * . If j charges p * , then all journals are sold and j 's profit is p * ; hence publisher j has no incentive to choose a price lower than p * . If instead j chooses p j > p * , then j 's journal is the most expensive one and the library will not buy it, since u < U MB (p j , (n − 1)p * + p j ) holds by Lemma 1(i).
In case u ≥ U MB (M/n, M) holds, p * = M/n is an equilibrium. Still, publisher j has no incentive to choose a price lower than p * because it can realize profit p * by charging p * . If it chooses p j > p * , then the library cannot afford to buy all the journals and, once again, will drop j 's journal because it is the most expensive.
The next proposition states that, regardless of the level of industry concentration (with the exception of monopoly for some parameters), there exists a unique equilibrium and it is such that all publishers are active and all journals are sold at the same price p * as just determined. 
(ii) The equilibrium is unique unless the industry is a monopoly and M < nv −1 (u).
Proof. Here we prove (i); the proof of (ii) is given in the Appendix. Suppose that each publisher except j charges price p * (as determined by the statement of the proposition) for any of its journals. We show that choosing p * for each journal is a best response for publisher j having n j number of journals; the monopoly case is a special case with n j = n. We first note that, for any p j ≡ (p 1j , . . . , p n j j ), the library will purchase any journal with price lower than or equal to p * because it is willing to buy n number of journals at price p * ; this follows from (2) 
Hence, for any p j , all the journals of any publisher j ( = j) will be purchased and j 's profit is equal to n j p * if it chooses p j ≡ (p * , . . . , p * ). Therefore, our proof is done if we show that j cannot achieve a profit higher than n j p * . This fact is obvious if M ≤ nv −1 (u), because for any p j the library buys all the journals of the other publishers and therefore spends at most M − (n − n j )p * = n j p * for the journals of j . For the case of M > nv −1 (u), suppose that j can realize a profit π j > n j p * . Then it is necessary that the library buys a journal of j with price p > p * and this requires u ≥ U MB (p , (n − n j )p * + π j ), but (2) and Lemma
Proposition 1 establishes several results. First, each publisher is active independently of the number of journals it owns; because each journal has the same value, any publisher can make a positive profit by pricing its journals low enough to undercut the prices of rivals. Furthermore, all the journals have the same price p * such that the library buys all of them. In the case of a monopolist, charging the same price for all journals minimizes the competition from books. 16 In the case of oligopoly (i.e., when N ≥ 2), if p (1) is the price of the most expensive journal that the library buys and if p ij < p (1) , then publisher j can increase its profit by suitably increasing the price of journal ij and reducing the prices of all its other journals in a way that induces the library to buy the same journals of j it purchased before but at a higher total price. A similar argument can be used to show that publisher j can increase its profit when some of its journals are not sold; therefore, all journals are sold in equilibrium.
Second, in equilibrium the competitive margin binds so that each publisher cannot raise the price of any of its journals without inducing the library to exclude that journal from the list of journals that it buys. We can further distinguish two cases depending on the way the margin binds. When the journal industry profit is smaller than M, the equilibrium price p * is determined by what we call marginal opportunity cost pricing in the following sense: The price p * is such that, after purchasing n − 1 journals at price p * , the library is indifferent between buying an extra journal at price p * and spending p * on buying books instead. This is 16. More precisely: Given a profit π, for any price vector p with shown in Figure 2 , where the area delineated by ABCD is equal to u. 17 When the journal industry profit is equal to M, the equilibrium price p * (= M/n) satisfies what we call generalized marginal opportunity cost pricing in that each journal leaves to the library the same extra positive surplus with respect to its opportunity cost, which is equal to u − v(M/n) ≥ 0. Generalized marginal opportunity cost pricing includes marginal opportunity cost pricing as a special case in which the extra surplus is equal to zero. In both cases, if a publisher increases the price of a journal from p * , the library does not purchase it any more. Finally, the irrelevance result states that the equilibrium price p * is the same for any level of industry concentration, except for the case of monopoly when M < nv −1 (u). This result comes mainly from the two following facts. First (as was previously explained) regardless of the level of concentration, some publisher can increase its profit unless all journals have the same price. Second, the symmetric equilibrium price is uniquely determined by the condition that makes the competitive margin bind, and this condition does not depend on industry concentration. Observe that the uniqueness result does not hold in the case of monopoly 17. The fact that each publisher regards its journal as the marginal one when choosing the price is similar to what happens in the literature on multilateral bargaining Zweibel 1996a, 1996b; Chemla 2003 ). For instance, Chemla studies competition among downstream firms buying from an upstream one and finds that each downstream firm pays the price that the marginal firm would pay to the upstream one. However, none of these papers studies the issue of bundling.
with M < nv −1 (u). Then, the monopolist can achieve profit M not only by charging the uniform price p * = M/n but also with any price vector such that (i) the sum of the prices is M and (ii) the highest price p satisfies u ≥ U MB (p , M). Finally, we note that the equilibrium price p * depends on the number of journals in the industry and their value.
Remark 1 (Robustness of the irrelevance result). Suppose that the library's utility from buying k number of journals is u(k), with u(·) increasing and concave. Then we can show that the irrelevance result holds as long as u(·) is not very concave.
From the irrelevance result, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. When journals are homogeneous and under independent pricing: (i) no merger has any impact on (merging or non merging) firms' profits and thus firms have no strict incentive to merge; and (ii) no merger affects social welfare unless it creates a monopoly and
Corollary 1(ii) deserves some explanation. If kv −1 (u) ≥ M for some k ≤ n − 1, then the monopolist can achieve profit M by selling just k journals instead of n. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that a merger which creates a monopolist reduces social welfare, because fewer than n journals may be sold if M is relatively small.
Bundling
In this Section we analyze B , the game in which each active publisher bundles its journals and chooses a price for the bundle. Without loss of generality, we suppose that U 1 ≥ U 2 ≥ . . . ≥ U N . Let A * represent the equilibrium set of active publishers, P * ≡ {P * j : j ∈ A * } the equilibrium prices charged by the active publishers, and π B * ≡ j ∈A * P * j the equilibrium industry profit in B . Notice that our analysis does not depend on whether journals are homogeneous or heterogeneous, because only the values U 1 , . . . , U N of the different bundles matter; therefore, the results in this section apply to the case of heterogeneous journals as well. The next theorem characterizes the unique equilibrium of B .
Theorem 1. Under bundling, there exists a unique equilibrium and it is characterized as follows.
(
only the largest publisher is active and realizes profit
, then only the k largest publishers are active; they charge prices that satisfy π B * = k j =1 P * j = M and
then all the publishers are active; they charge prices that satisfy π B * = N j =1 P * j < M and
We first note that the case of Proposition 1 in which n j = 1 for any j (i.e., each publisher owns only one journal) is a special case of parts (ii)-(iii) of this theorem with U j = u for all j and N = n. Observe also that all the bundles are sold if and only if the library's budget is large enough (i.e., if and only if
Otherwise, bundling entails that small publishers are unable to sell their journals whereas, under no bundling, all journals are sold for any value of M. In what follows, we provide the main intuition about the equilibrium in B by examining a special case with two publishers such that
Consider first the case in which the journal industry profit π B * is smaller than M; this implies that both publishers are active, since otherwise an inactive publisher could make a profit by choosing a small price. Then, the equilibrium prices P * = (P * 1 , P * 2 ) are determined by marginal opportunity cost pricing as in I when M is large:
Publisher j considers its bundle to be the marginal one and chooses P * j such that the library is indifferent between buying Bj and spending P * j on buying extra books. In the special case where
j ). This suggests that a solution to (5) exists if and only if
Second, consider the case in which the journal industry profit π B * is equal to M and both bundles are sold. Then P * is determined by generalized marginal opportunity cost pricing as in I :
In other words, there is a kind of Bertrand competition such that the extra surplus is the same for all the bundles. The vector P * constitutes an equilibrium, because lowering P j is obviously suboptimal for publisher j and because, if P j > P * j is chosen, then the library cannot afford to buy both bundles; it prefers dropping Bj because at P * it is indifferent between dropping B1 and dropping B2.
Finally, for a budget small enough we see that publisher 1's profit is equal to M, implying that publisher 2 cannot sell its bundle. This happens if U 1 − v(M) ≥ U 2 holds because then, for any P 2 > 0, the library prefers buying B1 rather than B2 even if P 1 = M, because the payoff U 1 from buying B1 is greater than U 2 + v(M − P 2 ), the payoff from buying B2 at P 2 and spending M − P 2 > 0 on books. The inequality
Example 2. Consider the parameters of Example 1: v(m) = 31m − m 2 , M = 10, u = 42, and n = 3. Then, under bundling, the following statements hold.
(i) If N = 2, and if n 1 = 2 and n 2 = 1, then P * 1 and P * 2 satisfy
hence P * 1 = 4.3655 and P * 2 = 1.9382. Notice that P * 1 > 2p * , p * > P * 2 , and P * 1 + P * 2 > 3p * . (ii) If N = 1 and n 1 = 3, then the monopolist chooses P m satisfy-
Theorem 1 and the discussion following the theorem show that marginal or generalized marginal opportunity cost pricing determines the prices under bundling in the same way as under independent pricing, and therefore the competitive margin binds.
The competition between each bundle of journals and the marginal bundle of books implies that a large publisher (i.e., a publisher with high U j ) has a competitive advantage over a small publisher. Given π B * , because v (·) is strictly decreasing, it follows that, as the number of books in the marginal bundle increases, the average surplus of the books in this bundle decreases. Therefore, the marginal bundle of books competing with the bundle of a large publisher has a lower average surplus than the marginal bundle of books competing with the bundle of a small publisher. This implies a sort of economies of scale under bundling. The next corollary formalizes this intuition in two different (though related) ways. The first result shows that publisher j 's profit per value of bundle P * j /U j strictly increases with the value U j of its bundle; the second result establishes that a large publisher obtains a relatively large share of the industry profit. 18 Corollary 2. Under bundling, we have:
We now use an example to discuss the role of our assumption (introduced in Section 2.4) about active and inactive publishers.
Example 3. Consider the setting with N = 3,
From the proof of Theorem 1 we know that there exists an equilibrium in B in which publisher 3 makes a profit if and only if 19 Because this inequality is violated with our parameters, there exists no equilibrium in which publisher 3 makes a positive profit. Without our assumption in Section 2.4 that makes publisher 3 inactive (i.e., publisher 3 stays out of the market), we find infinitely many equilibria in B . For instance,P = (5 − x, x, x) is an equilibrium for any x ∈ (0, 0.1], and in all these equilibria the library buys B1 and B2. 20 There also exists an equilibriumP = (5, 5, 5) in which the library buys only B1. Our assumption about active publishers eliminates all the infinite equilibria in which B1 and B2 are purchased, and it does not allow the price chosen by a publisher making zero profit to affect the equilibrium outcome. The consequence, for this particular example, is that only publisher 1 is active-as predicted by Theorem 1, because
18. The proof of the corollary is straightforward and so is omitted. 19. See Lemma 3(i) in the Appendix. 20. ThatP is an equilibrium can be verified as follows. (i) If publisher 1 increases P 1 above 5 − x, then the library obtains a higher payoff by purchasing B2 and B3 (3.5 + 5 − 2x + √ 5 − 2x) rather than B1 (10 + 5 − P 1 + √ 5 − P 1 ); (ii) if publisher 2 increases P 2 above x, then the library buys B1 and B3 (payoff 11.5) rather than B2 and B3 (3.5 + 5 − x − P 2 + √ 5 − x − P 2 ) or B2 only (2 + 5 − P 2 + √ 5 − P 2 ); (iii) if publisher 3 reduces P 3 to almost 0, then the library buys B1 and B2 (payoff 12) rather than B1 and B3 (11.5 + x − P 3 + √ x − P 3 ) or B2 and B3 (3.5 + 5 − x − P 3 + √ 5 − x − P 3 ).
Incentive to Bundle
In the previous sections, we examined the two different regimes of no bundling and bundling (games I and B , respectively). In this section, we inquire which of these regimes will emerge endogenously in game by examining each publisher's incentive to bundle. We obtain the following result. This result states that any profit publisher j can make without bundling its journals can also be obtained by bundling the journals; therefore, bundling is a weakly dominant strategy in for each publisher; however, this fact might be consistent with the existence of an equilibrium in in which one (or more) publisher(s) does not bundle. The second part of the proposition establishes that this is not the case.
Publishers have an incentive to bundle their journals because bundling has the direct effect of softening competition from books. In order to provide intuition, we consider a simple case of a monopolist owning two journals. Suppose that his profit under independent pricing is smaller than M. In this case, by Proposition 1, in I the monopolist chooses the same price p * for both journals, which is determined by marginal opportunity cost pricing:
Suppose now that the monopolist bundles his journals. Consider first the case in which he charges price 2p * for the bundle. Then, (7) and Lemma 1(ii) imply
Under independent pricing, both journals compete with the same marginal bundle of books that give utility U MB (p * , 2p * ) to the library. In contrast, under bundling it is as if the first journal competes with the marginal bundle of books giving utility U MB (p * , 2p * ) while the second journal competes with the marginal bundle of books giving utility
This explains why the inequality in (8) holds and hence why there exists an ε > 0 that satisfies
This inequality shows that the library will buy the bundle if the monopolist charges P = 2p * + ε as the price for the bundle. Thus, bundling allows the monopolist to increase his profit with respect to independent pricing; the same intuition applies to the case where there is an oligopoly.
Remark 2. 21 We derived the direct effect of bundling in a setting in which the utility from money is concave while the marginal utility from the consumption good (i.e., journals) is constant. The mechanism behind this direct effect is isomorphic to the mechanism behind two-part tariffs in a standard setting in which the marginal utility from money is constant and the utility from the good is concave. For instance, consider a consumer with payoff u(q) − t, where u(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, q is the quantity of the good she consumes, and t is her monetary payment. Suppose that a monopolist produces the good at a constant marginal cost c (>0). In this case, independent pricing is equivalent to linear pricing and thus leaves some surplus to the consumer, but the monopolist can extract the full surplus with a suitable two-part tariff in which the marginal price is equal to c.
Comparative Statics
Industry profit and social welfare. Now we study the effect of bundling on industry profit and social welfare. Let π I * denote industry profits under independent pricing. 
; this proves the second part of Proposition 3(i).
holds, then π B * = M by theorem 1 and so the first part of Proposition 3(i) holds trivially. Suppose on the other hand that M > N j =1 v −1 (U j ), so that π B * < M by Theorem 1. In order to prove that π B * > π I * we notice that, for each publisher j ,
21. We thank the referee for providing us with this idea.
Define P j (π) by U j ≡ U MB (P j (π ), π ) and observe that P j (·) is strictly decreasing by Lemma 1(i). Furthermore, Lemma 1(ii) and the first two equalities in (9) imply that P j (π I * ) > n j p * for any n j ≥ 2. We now prove π B * > π I * by contradiction. Suppose π B * ≤ π I * . Because P j (·) is strictly decreasing, we must have
then bundling strictly increases industry profits, implying that the library purchases fewer books in B than in I . Furthermore, under no bundling the library buys all the journals, whereas bundling can make small publishers unable to sell their journals (as stated in Theorem 1).
The result of Proposition 3(i) is due to the direct effect of bundling in terms of softening competition from books. To provide intuition, we consider the case in which π I * < M and suppose that bundling does not increase industry profits: π B * ≤ π I * . Then, the marginal bundle of books corresponding to any given price p has a lower value under bundling than under independent pricing because U MB (p, π B * ) ≤ U MB (p, π I * ) holds by Lemma 1(i). Therefore, from the direct effect, each publisher can make a higher profit under bundling than under independent pricing and hence we obtain a contradiction.
If publishers are symmetric in the sense that U 1 = · · · = U N , then bundling increases the profit of each publisher. If instead publishers are asymmetric, then the fact that bundling increases industry profits is bad news for small publishers, who cannot benefit much from the direct effect of bundling because a publisher's bundling has the indirect effect of inflicting negative pecuniary externalities on rival publishers. To provide intuition, we consider competition between a big publisher with U 1 = (n − N + 1)u (and n > N) and N − 1 small publishers with U 2 = · · · = U N = u. We focus on the case in which p * < M/n in I and compare I with B . Obviously, no small publisher as defined here can benefit from bundling since it has only one journal. However, by Proposition 3, the big publisher's bundling increases industry profits: π B * > np * . This inflicts negative externalities on all the small publishers, because the marginal bundle of books corresponding to a given price of journal has a higher surplus after 1's bundling than before. For instance, if π B * < M then each small publisher's profit in B is P * 2 with U MB (P * 2 , π B * ) = u = U MB (p * , np * ); hence, by Lemma 1(i), P * 2 is smaller than p * because π B * > np * . Furthermore, as we have seen in Theorem 1, these pecuniary externalities make the small publishers unable to sell their journals if U 1 is large enough to satisfy M ≤ v −1 (U 1 − u) . Because the fact that bundling increases industry profits implies that the library buys fewer books in B than in I , it follows that bundling reduces social welfare by reducing purchases of books and journals.
Remark 3 (Independent budget for journals) . When the budget M can be either used for the purchase of journals or kept in cash, we have a setting that is described formally by v(m) = m. Because most of the effects of bundling are based on the strict concavity of v, one might expect that bundling has no effect in this environment. In fact, this is true as long as U ≤ M because in this case the equilibrium price of a journal or a bundle is simply equal to its value. However, if U > M then bundling does not affect industry profits, which are equal to M, but it can reduce social welfare by making small publishers unable to sell their journals. As Theorem 1 shows, when industry profits are equal to M, there is a kind of Bertrand competition among bundles that makes the extra surplus the library gets from a bundle with respect to its opportunity cost the same for all the bundles sold, creating an advantage for large publishers.
Mergers. We have seen that there is no incentive to merge under independent pricing. Here we study how bundling affects this incentive by considering a merger of two publishers. Let π AM * (π BM * ) denote industry profits after the merger (before the merger) under bundling, and let π BM * j be publisher j 's profit before the merger. Let A BM * denote the set of active publishers before the merger and let j ≡ max{j : j ∈ A BM * } denote the active publisher with the lowest-valued bundle. (ii) The merger strictly increases industry profits if π BM * < M; otherwise,
(iii) The merger weakly reduces both book consumption (strictly if π BM * < M) and journal consumption. Hence, it always weakly reduces social welfare.
The proposition claims that a merger between any two active firms is strictly profitable unless the two firms already monopolize the market. As mentioned previously, in B each bundle of journals competes with the marginal bundle of books, and the average surplus of this bundle decreases as the number of books increases. Therefore, a large bundle of journals faces relatively soft competition from books. In this way, a merger increases profits of the merged publishers as well as industry profits. That the library spends more money on journals of the merging publishers, however, imposes negative pecuniary externalities on all the other publishers, who thus suffer a reduction in profits because of the merger. With respect to social welfare, because industry profits weakly increase as a consequence of the merger it is obvious that book consumption decreases. Furthermore, the merger may drive out of the market some publishers that were active before the merger (suggesting that the merger between RE and Harcourt is likely to be anticompetitive), yet it cannot induce previously inactive publishers to become active. Hence, any merger among active publishers weakly reduces social welfare.
Remark 4. The only role played by a merger in our setting is that it allows the merging publishers to create a larger bundle. Therefore, if two or more publishers agree to create a bundle of all their journals then this will have the same impact as a merger. As long as bundling is allowed, small publishers have an incentive to form a big bundle by making such an agreement. This can improve social welfare if big publishers' bundling would make the small publishers unable to sell their journals without the agreement. 22
Bundling and Incentive to Acquire a Journal
In this section, we study how bundling affects publishers' incentives to acquire a journal sold by a third party. Our previous results have shown that bundling can make small publishers unable to sell their journals. This may induce them to exit the market and to sell their journals to other publishers. Alternatively, the journal on sale can be interpreted as a new journal. Under this interpretation, we study how bundling affects the incentive to introduce a new journal by examining which publisher has the highest willingness to pay for it.
There are n number of journals before a third party sells a journal with value u through a second-price auction; b j represents the bid of publisher j . When each bidder knows before the auction the value that he attaches to the good on sale (the so-called setting of private values), it is well known that there exists a unique weakly dominant strategy for him: bidding his own valuation for the good. In our setting, however, a bidder's value for the auctioned journal is given by the difference between his profit if he wins the auction and his profit if some other publisher acquires the journal. Because the latter profit may depend on the identity of the winning publisher, a bidder may have no dominant strategy and this makes the analysis more complicated with respect to a standard secondprice auction. However, we know that under independent pricing the equilibrium prices do not depend on the industry structure; therefore, a dominant strategy equilibrium exists. Likewise, under bundling, when there are two publishers it is common knowledge that, if publisher 1 (resp. 2) does not win the journal, then publisher 2 (resp. 1) wins 23 and so a dominant strategy exists here as well. For simplicity, we assume that before the auction all publishers are active under 22. The agreement does not reduce book consumption, because the fact that some publishers were inactive before the agreement implies that industry profits before the agreement be equal to M. 23. We do not consider reserve prices or other instruments that may leave the journal in the hands of the auctioneer.
bundling, π B < M and U 1 > U 2 . Obviously, industry profits (weakly) increase after the auction. Under bundling, let π Bj denote industry profits when publisher j wins the auction.
We obtain the following result. Proof. We prove (i) here; see Appendix for the proof of (ii). Let p * (n) denote the equilibrium price in I described in Proposition 1 as a function of the number of journals. If publisher j wins the auction, we know from Proposition 1 that it will sell to the library all of its n j + 1 journals at the uniform price p * (n + 1), thus realizing a profit of (n j + 1)p * (n + 1). If instead publisher j loses the auction, another publisher will win the journal but the equilibrium price will still be p * (n + 1); in this case j 's profit will be n j p * (n + 1). Therefore, the increase in publisher j 's profit from winning the auction as compared to losing it is p * (n + 1) for j = 1, . . . , N, regardless of the identity of the winner. This implies that publishers j 's valuation is p * (n + 1) for j = 1, . . . , N. Hence each publisher has a (unique) weakly dominant strategy, which is b j = p * (n + 1) for j = 1, . . . , N.
Proposition 5 implies that bundling could have a serious impact on the evolution of industry concentration. In the absence of bundling, publishers have the same willingness to pay for an auctioned journal. In contrast, under bundling the largest publisher always has the highest willingness to pay for such a journal. Although a more careful analysis needs to be undertaken before predicting industry dynamics, our result suggests that bundling might create a vicious circle whereby big publishers induce the exit of small publishers and become even bigger by purchasing their titles.
The General Case of Heterogeneous Journals
In this section we consider the general case in which journals can have different values. Because Theorem 1 applies to B , we need only study I . Concerning the analysis of I , we find that the irrelevance result holds when we consider the two extreme cases of maximum industry concentration (when there is a monopolist) and minimum industry concentration (when each publisher owns only one journal). For the intermediate setting of oligopoly, the problem mentioned at the end of Section 3.2 arises: The prices of journals that are bought by the library might be affected by the prices of journals that are not bought. In particular, a publisher may choose prices for its unsold journals in a way that maximizes its profit from the journals it is able to sell; this makes the analysis very complicated. For the sake of tractability, we eliminate this problem by assuming (i) that each publisher chooses, from the set of its journals, a subset of active journals and makes a journal active only if it expects that journal to be sold at a strictly positive price and (ii) that the library can purchase only active journals. This assumption is stronger than the one introduced in Section 2.4, because in that case we allow a publisher to post prices for all its journals as long as the library buys at least one of them.
Under this assumption on active journals, there exists a unique equilibrium candidate (in pure strategies) regardless of the level of industry concentration; therefore, if the equilibrium exists, the irrelevance result holds. The equilibrium exists under the minimum and the maximum industry concentration but, for intermediate levels of concentration, it may not exist; we provide a sufficient condition for existence as well as an example of non existence. 24 The equilibrium of I when each publisher owns only one journal (i.e., N = n) can be obtained from Theorem 1 by replacing U j with u 1j , where u 1j represents the value of the unique journal owned by publisher j . 
Corollary 3. Under independent pricing, in the n-publisher, n-journal setting there exists a unique equilibrium and it is characterized as follows: (i) If
, then all publishers are active; they charge prices that satisfy π * = n j =1 p * 1j < M and
24. Observe that nonexistence in the example does not depend on the assumption about active journals.
Let u (k) be the value of the journal with the k-highest value; hence, u (1) ≥ . . . ≥ u (n) . The next theorem covers the general case in which at least one publisher owns two or more journals. Theorem 2(i) states that the level of industry concentration does not affect the outcome in the two extreme cases of minimum and maximum concentration as long as the industry profit is lower than M. 25 Furthermore, Theorem 2(ii)(a) establishes that the outcome does not depend on the level of industry concentration when 1 < N < n as long as I has an equilibrium. In the proof of Theorem 2(ii)(b), we show that the equilibrium exists if journals are nearly homogeneous (hence proposition 1, which deals with the case of homogeneous journals, is a special case of Theorem 2). The equilibrium may not exist because a multi journal publisher may change several prices at the same time and this deviation from the unique candidate price vector is sometimes profitable, as in our next example. u (h) ) and, in the candidate equilibrium, all journals are active with prices such that p 11 + p 21 + p 12 < 12, 1 = U MB (p 11 , π) = U MB (p 21 , π), and 24 = U MB (p 12 , π); this yields p * 11 = p * 21 ≈ 0.17 and p * 12 ≈ 11.566; however, a profitable deviation for publisher 1 is to set p 11 = p * 11 + 0.05 and p 21 = p * 21 + 0.05 because then the library's payoff is maximized by purchasing only publisher 1's journals. 26 25. As in the case of homogeneous journals, if π I * = M then for some parameters it is possible for the monopolist to realize a profit equal to M by selling a strict subset of the journals that are purchased by the library in the n-publisher, n-journal setting. 26. After the deviation of publisher 1, it is infeasible to buy all the journals because the sum of prices is greater than M. The payoff from buying journals 11 and 21 is 2 + 12 − 2 × 0.22 + 4 √ 12 − 2 × 0.22 = 27.16; the payoff from buying 11 and 12 (or 21 and 12) This example is somewhat counterintuitive, because the library buys the three journals under prices p * yet it buys journals 11 and 21 and not journal 12 after p 11 and p 21 increase while p 12 does not change. Note first that, conditional on the fact that journals 11 and 21 are purchased at prices p 11 = p ). However, given that it is suboptimal to buy all three journals, it is puzzling that the dropped journal is the one whose price is unchanged. Comparing the payoffs from the different alternatives sheds light on this issue; consider ε 1 = ε 2 = ε. If the library buys journals 11 and 21, its payoff is reduced by v(M −π +p * 12 )−v(M −π +p * 12 −2ε) > 0 with respect to the payoff before the changes in prices; if journals 11 and 12 (or 21 and 12) are purchased, the library's payoff decreases by
it is possible that the inequality holds for some ε owing to the strict concavity of v; in particular, it holds for ε = 0.05. In words, there is much more money left for books when an expensive journal like 12 is dropped than when a cheap one like 11 or 21 is dropped. Therefore, the utility loss from spending 2ε less money on books in the former case can be smaller than the utility loss from spending ε less money in the latter case.
As we mentioned before, Theorem 1 on B is valid regardless of whether journals are homogeneous or heterogeneous. Furthermore, in (the game in which each publisher chooses between bundling and no bundling) there always exists an equilibrium in which every active publisher bundles its journals and A * and P * are determined by Theorem 1. 27 Therefore, conditional on the existence of an equilibrium in I , most of the results we obtained in the case of homogeneous journals hold also in the general case of heterogeneous journals: The results concerning the incentive to bundle, the effect of bundling on profits and mergers, and the incentive to acquire a journal. With regard to how bundling affects social welfare, we must distinguish its impact on book consumption from its impact on journal consumption. Bundling decreases book consumption because the direct effect of softening competition from books increases industry profits. Whether bundling decreases or increases journal consumption depends on the degree of symmetry among publishers. For instance, in the extreme case of symmetric publishers with U 1 = · · · = U N , bundling may increase journal consumption because all bundles will be sold, whereas journals of small value might not be sold is 25 + 12 − 0.22 − 11.566 + 4 √ 12 − 0.22 − 11.566 = 27.064; and the payoff from buying only 12 is 24 + 12 − 11.566 + 4 √ 12 − 11.566 = 27.069. 27. Observe also that any equilibrium of in which a publisher does not bundle its journals requires the use of a weakly dominated strategy, since a result similar to Proposition 2(i) holds.
under independent pricing when journals are very heterogeneous. This scenario is not realistic however, because in fact a small number of commercial publishers own a large number of journals; 28 for instance, RE alone has about 1,800 journals. Because asymmetry among bundles is likely to be larger than asymmetry among individual journals it follows that bundling should reduce journal consumption, making it hard for small publishers to sell their journals even if their quality is high. 29
Concluding Remarks
Our analysis reveals that there is a strong conflict between private and social incentives in the bundling of e-journals: Each publisher wants to bundle its journals, and bundling increases industry profits but reduces social welfare. In particular, big publishers' bundling not only reduces consumption of monographs but also can make small publishers unable to sell even the high-quality journals they own. In this respect, it is noteworthy that Wolters Kluwer, which is the sixth-largest player in the industry by revenues, recently opted to exit scientific publishing and to focus solely on medical publishing, citing lack of scale as the reason for the exit (Gooden, Owen, and Simon 2002) .
We found that bundling has two other important effects. First, bundling creates incentives for mergers. However, mergers among active publishers reduce social welfare by reducing book and journal consumption. In contrast, mergers among (small) publishers who would not otherwise be able to sell their journals might increase social welfare. Alternatively, it would be desirable for small publishers who have high-quality journals to sell their journals through a common agency, as in the case of JSTOR. Second, bundling can have a serious impact on the evolution of industry concentration by affecting the incentives to acquire other journals. We have shown that in the absence of bundling each publisher has the same willingness to pay for a journal, whereas under bundling the largest publisher always has the highest willingness to pay. Hence, bundling might create a vicious cycle that enables big publishers to force the exit of small ones and hence become even bigger by purchasing their titles.
We studied how bundling affects a library's purchase of journals and books when its budget is given. It would be interesting to study how bundling affects the choice of the budget. For instance, one can consider the case in which the university of a library is a first mover and can set the budget before publishers 28. Measured by revenue, in 2001 Elsevier Science had a 16.0% industry share, with Kluwer at 8.2% and Thomson-Scientific & Healthcare at 7.5% (Edlin and Rubinfeld 2004) . 29. Some publishers believe that, if they are below no. 5 on the shopping list of libraries, then there is no guarantee that there will be any money left in the library budgets for purchasing their journals (Key Perspectives 2002). make any decision. Although a complete analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this paper, we have found that in the case of heterogeneous journals (conditional on equilibrium existence under independent pricing) bundling has an ambiguous effect on the university's incentive to increase its library's budget with respect to independent pricing (and so it is possible that bundling induces the university to increase the budget). 30 Finally, it would be interesting to extend our framework to other economic situations such as bundling (or block booking) in the distribution of movies and of TV or radio programs. 31 A rationale for the per se illegal status of block booking 32 comes from the concern that block booking of high-quality movies with lowquality ones would make it difficult for small producers to get their high-quality movies into theaters. Our analysis shows that such concern is justified, at least in the market for e-journals.
Appendix

A.1. Proof of Proposition 1(ii)
We note first that, in the case of the monopolist with M ≥ nv −1 (u), charging the uniform price p * is the only way to achieve the maximum profit np * , otherwise we have a contradiction: The most expensive journal among the ones the library buys has price p (1) strictly higher than p * , but it would not be purchased because u = U MB (p * , np * ) < U MB (p (1) , np * ) holds. Therefore, in what follows we focus on the case of N ≥ 2. The proof is composed of three claims. It is useful to recall that, given the prices chosen by active publishers, it is optimal for the library to buy the n (≤n) cheapest journals, where n is endogenous. Proof. Suppose that publisher h is not active. Then we can easily show that he can make a positive profit if he becomes active. Given the prices of the journals of active publishers, let publisher h choose the same price ε > 0 for each of his journals, small enough to make them cheaper than any journal of other active 30. Under independent pricing and under bundling, as the library's budget increases its payoff is piecewise constant; it jumps upward at a number of points and then increases in a continuous way. In the case of bundling, the jumps occur less frequently but are larger. 31. Because we assume price discrimination that is based on usage, our explanation of bundling is quite different from the one given by Stigler (1968) , which is based on second-degree price discrimination. 32. For the antitrust cases, see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. et al. (1948) and United States v. Loew's, Inc. et al. (1962) . In MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp. (11th Circuit, April 1999) , the court of appeals reaffirmed the per se illegal status of block booking.
publishers. Because u > U MB (ε, n h ε) for a small ε, the library buys all the journals of publisher h and he makes a profit of n h ε > 0.
Claim 2. If N ≥ 2 then, in any equilibrium of I , every journal has the same price (denoted byp) and all the journals are purchased by the library.
Proof. For any j , let R j (Z j ) be the set of j 's journals that are sold (not sold); R ≡ N j =1 R j and Z ≡ N j =1 Z j . We first prove that all journals in R have the same price. Let p (1) ≡ max ij ∈R {p ij } denote the price of the most expensive journal the library buys; then u ≥ U MB (p (1) , π) . We prove that if p ih < p (1) for some ih ∈ R, then publisher h can increase his profit by increasing the price of journal ih by ε > 0 small enough and reducing by ε/|R h | the price of each other journal in R h , where |R h | is the number of journals in R h . Letp ih = p ih + ε andp i h = p i h − ε/|R h | for any i h ∈ R h \{ih}. 33 At the new prices, it is obvious that the library buys all the journals in R h if at least one journal with price p (1) is still purchased, because each journal in R h has a price smaller than p (1) . If instead no journal with price p (1) is purchased, then also no journal in Z is purchased because p ij ≥ p (1) for any ij ∈ Z. Therefore, an upper bound for the new industry profit is π − p (1) + ε, where π is the industry profit before publisher h's prices change. This implies that all the journals in R h are purchased becausẽ p
Now we prove that all the journals are sold. Suppose that ih ∈ Z for some i and h. Then publisher h can increase his profit by setting p ih = ε > 0 and reducing the price of each journal in R h by ε/(1 + |R h |). In this way, all the journals in R h ∪ {ih} are purchased because they are cheaper than any journal in j =h R j , and the logic of the proof in the previous paragraph applies. 
holds and so we must havep < M/n. We now show thatp < M/n implies u = U MB (p, np). To prove this, suppose that p < M/n and u > U MB (p, np) hold. Then, let a publisher h increase the price of one of his journals top + ε with ε > 0 small enough. In this case, all journals of all publishers are still sold because u > U MB (p, np) implies u > U MB (p+ε, np+ε).
33. Note that we can assume without loss of generality that some publisher j = h owns a journal with price p (1) that is purchased by the library.
Finally, u = U MB (p, np) has a unique solution smaller than M/n, given that M > nv −1 (u).
In the case of M ≤ nv −1 (u),p must be equal to M/n because u > U MB (p, np) for any p < M/n.
We have therefore proved Claims 1-3 and thus Proposition 1(ii). 
A.2. A Useful Lemma
If buying all the items in S is optimal, then buying all gives a higher utility than buying all except a particular item s for any s ∈ S. Therefore, the following condition must be satisfied:
which is equivalent to (A.1).
(⇐) Let S ⊆ S denote a subset of S with P S = s∈S p s and U S ≡ s∈S u s . Suppose that (A.1) holds, which implies that
Here the second inequality holds because U MB (p s , P S ) is concave in the first argument and U MB (0, P S ) = 0. The inequality U S ≥ U MB (P S , P S ) implies that buying all items in S gives a higher utility than buying all except the subset S , because
Because S can be any subset of S, we conclude that buying all the items in S is optimal when (A.1) is satisfied.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove two lemmas that together allow us to prove Theorem 1. In the first lemma, we take the set A of active publishers as given and show that there exists a unique candidate equilibrium price vector. The second lemma describes how A is uniquely determined depending on the level of M. Therefore, the two lemmas identify a unique equilibrium candidate as a function of M. Finally, we prove that the candidate is indeed an equilibrium. Let j = max{j : j ∈ A} denote the active publisher with the lowest-valued bundle; obviously, j depends on A even though we do not indicate this in the notation. Furthermore, let A = A\{j } denote the set of active publishers excluding j . 
; furthermore, P * A * is unique and satisfies 
Proof of (i). In any equilibrium of B , P * A * is such that B j is sold for any j ∈ A * ; otherwise publisher j will not be active. Because π B * = M, Lemma 2 implies
In order for no publisher to have an incentive to increase the price of his bundle above the price in P * A * , the following condition must be satisfied:
for some j and j in A * , then we can show that publisher j can increase P j slightly from P * j to P * j + ε and sell his bundle. After j 's price change, the library cannot afford to buy all the bundles in A * 35. For clarity we use the notation P * A * in this Appendix instead of the P * used in the main text.
because the sum of the prices is greater than M. However, Lemma 2 and (A.4) imply that the library will drop exactly one bundle. 36 Given U A * = h∈A * U h , the alternative of dropping B j is suboptimal because it gives the library a smaller payoff as compared to dropping Bj : U A * −U j +v(P * j ) < U A * −U j +v(P * j −ε) for a small ε. This establishes that B j will be purchased and that publisher j 's profit increases. Hence, (A.5) must hold. Finally, (A.4) and (A.5) imply that (A.2) holds. Now we prove that a (unique) P * A * satisfying π B * = M, (A.2), and P * j > 0 for all j ∈ A * exists if and only if j
Use (A.2) to write P j as a function of P j as follows:
for any j ∈ A * . After combining this with π B * = M, we obtain
Note that F is strictly increasing in P j and that v −1 (U j ) is the highest value of P j consistent with (A.4). Because
Proof of (ii). Because π B * < M, Lemma 2 implies
for any j ∈ A * . We prove that if this inequality holds strictly for one j ∈ A * then publisher j can increase his profit by choosing P j = P * j + ε with ε > 0 small. By Lemma 2, if the library does not buy Bj then it buys all other bundles because U h > U MB (P * h , π B * − P * j ) for any h ∈ A * \{j }. Its payoff is then U A * − U j + v(M − π B * + P * j ). If the library also buys B j then its payoff is U A * + v(M − π B * − ε), and this is larger than
and ε is close to 0. 37 Therefore, (A.3) must be satisfied by P * A * . Now we prove that a (unique) P * A * satisfying π B * < M, (A.3), and P * j > 0 for all j ∈ A * exists if and only if j ∈A * v −1 (U j ) < M. From (A.3) we obtain
for all j ∈ A * , and adding this equality over
37. We are not proving that the library will buy all the bundles after the increase in the price of Bj . Rather, we prove that the (only) alternative in which Bj is not purchased is suboptimal. Hence the library will buy Bj , but it may not buy Bj if
is the number of publishers in A * . Hence, we need to find π ∈ (0, M) such that G(π) = 0, where
Proof of (iii). Parts (i) and (ii) of the lemma show that
is a necessary condition for (A * , P * A * ) to be an equilibrium of B . Our next lemma is about determining the set A * .
Lemma 4. Suppose that (A * , P * A * ) is an equilibrium of B . Then: (i) publisher 1 is active for any M > 0, and if
Proof of (i). Suppose that
k−1 j =1 v −1 (U j − U k ) < M for some k ∈ {2, . .
. , N} and that h /
∈ A * for some h ≤ k. We now show that publisher h can make a profit by choosing a suitable P h . First, if π B * < M then it is trivial to see that Bh is purchased at P h > 0 close to 0, because
Consider now π B * = M. Then it is enough to prove that the inequality U h > U j − v(P * j ) holds, because we can apply the argument in the proof of Lemma 3(i) to show that publisher h can sell his bundle by setting P h > 0 close to 0. To show that U h > U j − v(P * j ), we distinguish the case of j > h from the case of j < h. For j > h, the inequality U h > U j − v(P * j ) follows simply from U h ≥ U j . When j < h, we know from Lemma 3 that P * A * satisfies (A.2) and therefore P * j solves (A.6). The inequality
, holds because F is strictly increasing and because
Notice that if h = 1 then only the case j > h may arise, and therefore 1 ∈ A * for any M > 0.
Proof of (ii) . In this proof, let k = 1 if M ≤ v −1 (U 1 −U 2 ); otherwise, k is defined as in the statement of Lemma 4(ii). From Lemma 4(i) we know that {1, . . . , k} ⊆ A * . We will show that a contradiction arises if j > k. Because, from Lemma 3(iii), the inequality j ∈A * v −1 (U j − U j ) < M should be satisfied and because we
However, the last inequality fails to hold if j > k, because this implies {1, . . . , k} ⊆ A * and U k+1 ≥ U j .
Proof of Theorem 1(i).
Lemma 4(ii) and Lemma 3 imply (respectively) that A * = {1} and that P * 1 = M. Proof of Theorem 1(ii). Lemma 4 and Lemma 3 imply (respectively) that A * = {1, . . . , k} in any equilibrium and that P * A * is the unique solution to (A.2). We now demonstrate that (A * , P * A * ) is indeed an equilibrium of B by proving the two following claims.
Claim 1. Publisher h ∈ A * cannot make a profit larger than P * h given A = A * and P j = P * j for any j ∈ A * \{h}.
Proof. Let h ∈ A * . We know from Lemma 2 that all the bundles in A * are sold if P h ≤ P * h ; we shall prove here that Bh is not purchased if P h > P * h . Clearly, when P h > P * h the library cannot afford to buy all the available bundles. If it buys Bh, let Z = ∅ denote the set of the bundles in A * that it no longer buys, with U Z ≡ z∈Z U z and P * Z ≡ z∈Z P * z . Then the library's payoff is
, where U A * = z∈A * U z . If instead the library buys all the bundles except Bh, then its payoff is U A * − U h + v(P * h ). We prove that the latter payoff is strictly larger than the former for any P h > P * h by showing that the weak inequality holds at
and hence the latter inequality is equivalent to v P *
, where the first inequality comes from (A.2) and the second from the strict concavity of v(·).
Claim 2. Publisher h /
∈ A * cannot make a positive profit given A = A * and P j = P * j for any j ∈ A * .
Proof. Let h / ∈ A * . We now prove that at no price P h > 0 will the bundle Bh be sold. For this purpose, we first show that U j −v(P * j ) ≥ U h for any j ∈ A * . Given A * = {1, . . . , k} we have j = k, and the solution P * k of (A.6) is weakly smaller
and this implies, from (A.2) and U k+1 ≥ U h , that U j − v(P * j ) ≥ U h for any j ∈ A * . Using this inequality, we can argue as in the proof of Claim 1 to show that at no price P h > 0 will the bundle Bh be sold; hence, it is a best reply for publisher h to be non active.
Proof of Theorem 1(iii).
Lemma 4(i) and Lemma 3(ii) imply (respectively), that A * = {1, . . . , N} and that P * A * is the unique solution to (A.3). The proof that no publisher h has an incentive to choose P h = P * h is quite similar to the proof of Claim 1 and so is omitted.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2
We use I ⊆ A * to represent the set of active publishers who sell their journals independently; B ≡ A * \I is the set of active publishers who bundle their journals. Let π j denote the profit of publisher j (j ∈ A * ); π ≡ j ∈A * π j is the industry profit. In any equilibrium, it is obvious that B j is sold for any j ∈ B and that at least one journal of publisher j is sold for any j ∈ I . Let R j and Z j (j ∈ I ) have the same meanings as in the proof of Claim 2 of Proposition 1; R ≡ j ∈I R j and Z ≡ j ∈I Z j .
Proof of Proposition 2(i).
Suppose that j ∈ I and that the library optimally spends π j > 0 on buying some journals of publisher j . Then it is still optimal for the library to buy Bj at price π j , for otherwise the library would have improved its payoff by not buying any journal from publisher j when his journals were sold independently.
Proof of Proposition 2(ii).
We prove the result after proving two claims, which together establish that all journals of all publishers in I are sold. 1 ≡ max i1∈R 1 {p i1 } be the price of the most expensive journal among the journals of publisher 1 that the library buys. First, notice that if π < M then publisher 1 can increase his profit by charging a uniform price p 1 = (π 1 + ε)/n 1 for all his journals, where π 1 is his profit before this deviation. Then all journals of 1 are sold because u ≥ U MB (p (1) 1 , π) and p (1)
1 ) for some j ∈ B then publisher 1 can increase his profit by choosing a small price ε > 0 for one of his journals in Z 1 -denoted by i1-and reducing by δ the price of each journal in R 1 whose price was equal to p (1) 1 , so that the sum of prices of journals in R 1 ∪ {i1} is larger by α > 0 than before. The library cannot afford to buy i1 and all the items it purchased before the deviation, but by Lemma 2 it will buy all of these items except one. Dropping a journal of 1 with price p
where U is the total surplus from journals and bundles that the library obtains before 1's price changes. Dropping Bj yields
1 − δ − α) at α = 0 and thus (by continuity) also at some α > 0.
1 ) for all j ∈ B. Then a necessary condition for a particular j ∈ B not to profitably deviate by slightly increasing the price of Bj is that there exist a t ≥ 1 such that
wherep is the average price of the t cheapest journals in Z 1 . We now prove that a profitable deviation for publisher 1 is to bundle all his journals at a price P 1 = π 1 + ε > π 1 . Once again, only one bundle will be dropped. The library's payoff from dropping Bj is U + |Z 1 |u − U j + v(P j − ε) whereas the payoff from dropping B1 is U − |R 1 |u + v(π 1 ). The latter payoff is smaller than the former because now we prove that
By Claims 1 and 2, in the rest of the proof we may assume that all journals of all publishers in I are sold and that |I | ≥ 2. shows that a publisher in I still sells all his journals if he increases the price of one of them top + ε with ε > 0 and small. Now let publisher j ∈ I bundle his n j ≥ 2 journals at price π j +ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small; the library does not have enough money to buy all the available items, but after arguing as in the proof of Lemma 3(i) we see that it will purchase all items except one. The payoff from dropping Bj is U − un j + v(π j ), and the payoff from not buying a different item , π) for some s then the publisher of item s can increase his profit by slightly increasing the price of s. The proof of this result mimics the arguments just given for the case of π = M and in the proof of Lemma 3(ii). Now let publisher j bundle his n j ≥ 2 journals at price P j = π j + ε with ε > 0 small enough. We prove that Bj is sold and hence that publisher j increases his profit. Lemma 2 implies once again that at most one item is not purchased. Suppose by way of contradiction that it is Bj ; then the library's payoff is U − n j u + v(M − π + π j ). If Bj is added to the other items, the payoff increases by
From u = U MB (p, π),pn j = π j , and Lemma 1(ii), we have n j u > U MB (π j , π). Hence (A.10) is positive for ε = 0 and also for a small ε > 0.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that all publishers are active before the merger. Without loss of generality, we assume that publisher 1 merges with publisher 2. Let P BM * j and P AM * j denote the prices before and after the merger, respectively, of Bj (j = 1, . . . , N); P * 1&2 is the price charged by publisher 1&2 after the merger. Consider the case in which N j =1 v −1 (U j ) < M, so that π BM * < M, and assume that v −1 (U 1 + U 2 )+ N j =3 v −1 (U j ) < M; this implies π AM * < M. To prove that π AM * > π BM * , we suppose by contradiction that π AM * ≤ π BM * . By the virtue of (4) we obtain: . Furthermore, (4) for j = 3, . . . , N implies (A.13) which means that the merger (weakly) increases the profit of any non merged publisher. Because the merger increases each publisher's profit, this contradicts the assumption π AM * ≤ π BM * . Thus we must have π AM * > π BM * , which implies that the profit of publisher j (j = 3, . . . , N) is reduced because of (A.13) and hence that the profit of publisher 1&2 is larger than P BM * 1 + P BM * 2 . If π AM * = M then it is obvious that π AM * > π BM * . Then (A.13) implies again that the profit of publisher j (j = 3, . . . , N) is reduced and, as a consequence, the profit of publisher 1&2 is larger than P BM * (4) imply P 1 h ≥ P 2 h for all h ≥ 3; we now prove that P 1 1 + P 1 2 > P 2 1 + P 2 2 to obtain a contradiction. Notice that P 1 1 and P 1 2 are such that
Define f 1 (π) and f 2 (π) as follows: 38
We now prove that f 1 (π B1 ) and f 2 (π B1 ) satisfy P 1 1 − f 1 (π B1 ) > f 2 (π B1 ) − P 1 2 . Because v is strictly decreasing, it follows that
These equations and the inequality f 1 (π B1 ) > P 1 2 together imply that P 1 1 − f 1 (π B1 ) > f 2 (π B1 ) − P 1 2 . Hence, P 1 1 + P 1 2 > f 1 (π B1 ) + f 2 (π B1 ) and finally f 1 (π B1 ) + f 2 (π B1 ) ≥ f 1 (π B2 ) + f 2 (π B2 ) = P 2 1 + P 2 2 because f 1 and f 2 are decreasing. This gives P 1 1 + P 1 2 > P 2 1 + P 2 2 and thus the contradiction. Claim 3. If N ≥ 3 and j = 1, then P 1 j < P h j for any h / ∈ {1, j}.
Proof. Notice that, if π Bh < M, then π B1 > π Bh and pecuniary externalities (i.e., (3) or (4)) imply P 1 j < P h j . If instead π Bh = M, then π B1 = π Bh and we prove P 1 j < P h j as follows. Suppose (without loss of generality, but only to simplify For a given P N , the left-hand side in (A.14) is larger than the left-hand side in (A.15) because .16) given that U 1 > U h and because v −1 is convex. Let P 1 N satisfy (A.14) and let P h N satisfy (A.15). Given (A.16), the left-hand side of (A.14) at P N = P h N is larger than M; hence P 1 N < P h N . From P j = v −1 [U j −U N +v(P N )] we obtain P 1 j < P h j for all h / ∈ {1, j}. Proof. We first prove that, for publisher j ≥ 2, any bid larger than P j j − P 1 j is weakly dominated byb j = P j j − P 1 j (hence, in any undominated equilibrium, publisher j bidsb j or less). The difference between the profit upon winning the auction and the one upon losing it for publisher j is P j j − P h j when publisher h = j is the winner. Because P j j − P h j < P j j − P 1 j =b j for any h / ∈ {1, j} by Claim 3, it follows that the difference for publisher j between a bid b j (>b j ) and the bidb j is that the first bid makes j win also in some cases when he must pay a price larger thanb j ; but in such cases j prefers losing the auction to winning it. Now suppose that publisher j makes the highest bid among publishers other than 1 and that he bids b j . If P 1 1 − b j > P j 1 , then 1 is happier when he wins the auction at price b j than when he loses it, and he can win at price b j by bidding any number larger than b j . Therefore, if 1 does not win the journal then it is necessary that b j ≥ P 1 1 − P j 1 . However, we have already proved that any bid larger than b j = P j j − P 1 j is weakly dominated for bidder h. We show that P 1 1 − P j 1 >b j , which implies that 1 does not win the auction only if some other publisher is "zwu004060382" -2006/7/6 -page 1077 -#40 playing a weakly dominated strategy. Claim 3 and the inequality π B1 ≥ π Bj imply P 1 1 − P j 1 >b j .
A.7. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2(i).
Consider first the case of M > n i=1 v −1 (u i1 ). Then we know from Corollary 3 that the industry profit π I * under the n-publisher, n-journal setting is smaller than M. We prove by contradiction that the monopolist's profit is smaller than π I * if he chooses prices different from p * . Suppose that the monopolist can realize a profit π ≥ π I * with p = p * . This implies that, among the journals sold, there must be at least one journal i1 whose price p i1 is strictly higher than p * 1i , the price of journal 1i in the n-publisher, n-journal setting. This yields the contradiction
given Lemma 1 and that π ≥ π I * and p i1 > p * 1i . If M ≤ n i=1 v −1 (u i1 ), the monopolist can obtain profit M by choosing the prices p * as under the n-publisher, n-journal setting because, by Lemma 2, those prices induce the library to buy all the journals 11, . . . , n1.
journal can increase his profit. If π < M, he can make the journal active at a small
